

UNCLASSIFIED



Operation TOGETHER FORWARD BCT Employment Options

Breaking the Cycle of Sectarian Violence

Senior Plans Meeting

29 Jan 07

3/3 N Bell
4/2 D. Pala
2/3 S. Bell
Bagd

DRG still
in place

5 BCTs
- 2 To Bagd
- 3 Bagd
Anbar
N Bell
S. Bell
Bagd, D. Pala

Problem: How do we secure the population of Baghdad while helping the GOI transition to security self-reliance?

Overall Classification for this Brief is ~~SECRET//REL to USA, MCF//MR~~

As of 29 JAN 07
ACTO b. 3. b. 6)

UNCLASSIFIED



Purpose and Agenda

Purpose: *Provide the Commander operational and threat conditions for employment of 5 additional BCTs*

Agenda:

- Received Guidance
- Refined Threat SITEMP
- New Operational Conditions
- Commander's Mission and Intent
- Current Friendly Set
- Refined FFIR
- Decision Points, Unit Capabilities, Deployment Timeline and Employment Options
- Comments and Guidance



Received Guidance

(Senior Plans Meeting)

- The first two BCTs go to Baghdad
- Lay out the options for remaining three BCTs by
 - Refining Decision Points
 - Reflecting assumptions and
 - Defining conditions that exist for the commitment of additional BCTs
- Clean up the tasks—five key tasks:
 - Assist the ISF in securing the population of Baghdad
 - Exploit and reinforce success in Anbar
 - Disrupt the Sunni/Shia extremists in southern Diyala
 - Assist the ISF in securing the population of Baqubah
 - Reduce the accelerants of sectarian violence
- Where [and how] will the two Marine Battalions be employed? •
- What if Shia extremists conduct operations in Center-South and / or Southeast?
- Provide more detail on PRT organization, provincial considerations, continuity of threat and unity of effort
- What will the Iraqis accept? PM SoE Directive •

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF//MR~~



Received Guidance

(Intel Fusion Brief)

late
since 1 Oct

- To secure Baghdad we have to secure the Support Zones
- I need a slide that shows threat strength in the Baghdad support zones overlaid with CF boundaries down to Battalion level
- I need a map with tribes overlaid on it

SECRET//REL-USA and MCFH/MR

Baghdad Beltway AAs

#1 Tarmiyah-Saab al Bour

• VBIEDs

• T&FF

AQI/AIF

Baqubah

Tarmiyah

Hussaniyah

Taji

Sa'ab al-Bour

Kahn Bani Sa'd

#4 Hussaniyah - Baqubah

• Weapons to Shia
in Baqubah, Balad

• VBIEDs, T&FF
to Baqubah

AQI/AIF

#2 Salman Pak

• VBIEDs to
Baghdad

• EFPs/Weapons to
Shia militia

AQI/AIF

Salman Pak

#3 Iskandaria - Fiyahs

• VBIEDs, T&FF
to Baghdad

• EFPs/Weapons to
Shia militia

AQI/AIF

LEGEND

Key City

MSR/ASR

Key Road

Sunni Primary LOC


Shi'a Primary LOC

Mixed Primary LOC



SECRET//REL USA and MCF//MR

Baghdad Beltway Insurgent Overview



CAUTION
NO DISSEMINATION
EXCEPT TO
AUTHORIZED
PERSONNEL

SECRET//REL USA and MCF//MR

Page 7 redacted for the following reason:

1.4c, (b)(6)

Approved for Release



~~SECRET // REL TO USA, IRQ, MCFH//20061221~~

MNC-I Priority Intelligence Requirements

(As of: 15 JAN 07)

1. What conditions threaten to undermine the functions or unity of the GOI?
2. Who/where are the key individuals/groups that are accelerants (VBIED/EJK) of sectarian violence? What methods are they using?
3. What/where are the critical terrorist and extremist C3I or support nodes that, if destroyed or interdicted, will dramatically degrade insurgent operations?
4. Who/where are extremist organizations/networks that are attacking CF with EFPs? Where are cache/assembly areas?
5. Who/where are external influences proliferating weapons technology (EFP) or facilitating personnel flow into Iraq?
6. What IED technological or TTP improvements threaten increased CF/ISF/CIVILIAN casualties?
7. Where are missing military personnel, coalition nationals, and designated prominent Iraqis located and who/which groups are responsible for holding them?
8. How are insurgents using the informational environment to undermine the GOI or CF?
9. What militia and insurgent activity is occurring in areas without coalition forces that impact the security of Iraq?
10. What significant events/locations do terrorists, extremists, or insurgent organizations plan to conduct attacks?
11. Who/where are the criminal or extremist organizations that are attacking critical oil, electric and water infrastructure?

New Operational Conditions

- 5 BCTs (approximately 20K soldiers) and enablers are expected to deploy to the ITO to assist the ISF secure the population of Baghdad and set conditions for transition to Iraqi Security Self-Reliance
- Prime Minister Maliki's recent political announcements and State of Emergency Directive demonstrate ^{doubts about sincerity...} Gol willingness to make a sincere commitment to providing security for their own people
- The Baghdad Operational Command has stood up and is anticipated to be IOC by 5 Feb 07
- 1.4c emphasis on Baghdad Shia and Sunni Support Zones
- RFF for Division HQ has been forwarded to HQDA and is expected to arrive to alleviate command and control strain on MND-B
- Samarra mosque National Police Brigade is being formed
- A Medium Combat Aviation Brigade will deploy to Iraq

No Change

MNC-I Mission Statement

MNC-I conducts kinetic and non-kinetic operations in conjunction with the ISF to secure Baghdad and its population in order to reduce sectarian violence and facilitate the implementation of the Baghdad Security Plan and the continued transition to Iraqi security self-reliance

2
comparing tasks in context
the size of force in the
and raising

No Change

Commander's Intent

(1 of 3)

- **Purpose**

In order to break the current cycle of sectarian violence, we must set the conditions for the ISF to emerge as the dominant security force, able to protect the population and provide security in a fair and impartial manner. This operation will be Iraqi-led with Coalition support. much more than a military operation alone, it must include a combination of military, economic, and political actions achieved through a partnering with key agencies.

Militarily, we must interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence emerging from southern Salah ad Din, eastern Diyala, and western Anbar, exploiting recent successes in these areas to continue the transition to Iraqi Security Self-Reliance and enhance the prospects for reconciliation. A key will be our ability to neutralize VBIED and EFP networks.

Within Baghdad, we must move deliberately maintain a robust, combined presence in each administrative district until we have firmly established joint security stations manned by CF alongside ISF that are loyal to the GOI and can provide adequate protection for the population. Our operations must be deliberate, our goals achievable and sustainable. We will only be decisive when security is sustained over time with Iraqis fully in charge.

Economically, we must create a combination of near-term and long-term employment opportunities and improve basic services in order to generate economic growth in all neighborhoods.

Politically, we must set benchmarks to address the dismantling of Shia militias, deal with de-Baathification, and move towards provincial and local elections.

No Change

Commander's Intent

(2 of 3)

- Key Tasks

- In conjunction with the ISF, secure the Iraqi people, with a focus on Baghdad, as a minimum:
 - Maintain consistent forward presence – 24/7 CF coverage in clear, control, and retain areas until CF shift to the periphery
 - Be deliberate – resist the urge to surge; as the operation progresses, give priority to the retention and control of cleared areas; ensure the right amount of security forces are controlling the districts
 - Achievable – demonstrate real and perceived success, early-on and throughout the operation
 - Sustainable – as ISF and CF control expands, avoid overstretch and prevent re-infiltration; carefully consider the risks of committing to new clearing operations

Interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence

- Neutralize VBIED networks
- Neutralize Sunni and Shia extremists that conduct EJKs, IED and IDF attacks – balanced operations targeting groups on both sides of the sectarian divide
- Improve security at Ports of Entry to reduce illegal cross-border activity. with a priority to stemming the flow of 1.4b
- Enhance the capability and legitimacy of the ISF
- Transition to Iraqi security self-reliance
- In coordination with PRTs and Interagency partners, implement economic development initiatives

Friendly Forces Operating in Support Zones





Confirmation

Decision Points 8

(4/1 ID)



Decision: Request BCT #17 be brought forward from Kuwait and employed in Baghdad

Desired Effects:

1B: Populace in Urban Centers Secure

3C: Perpetrators of sectarian violence neutralized

3B: Insurgency lacks the ability to conduct effective ops

4A: IED Network Neutralized

SIR

1. What is the current level of sectarian violence in Baghdad?
2. Are the accelerants of sectarian violence (EJK, VBIEDs) present in Baghdad?
3. What is the status of militias in Baghdad?
4. Are EFPs effective against Coalition and/or Iraqi Security Forces?
5. What is the current status of the nine administrative districts of Baghdad?
6. What is the current level of violence in the Baghdad Security Belts?


FFIR

1. Do we have enough forces to Clear, Control, and Retain Baghdad's nine administrative districts?
2. Do we have enough forces to secure the Baghdad Security Belt?
3. Do we have enough forces to disrupt the flow of VBIED's and EFPs into Baghdad?
4. Do we have enough forces to secure the Southern LOCs?

15

IBCT Capability and Deployment Timeline

- 3400 soldiers
- Core capabilities
 - 2 Infantry Battalions=6 Rifle Companies; 6 Motorized Assault Platoons; 2 Scout Platoons; 2 Sniper Sections
 - 1 Reconnaissance Battalion=2 Motorized Recon Troops; 1 Dismounted Troop
 - 1 Fires Battalion=2 Firing Batteries; 3 JTACs; Target Acquisition Platoon
 - Support Battalion=Maintenance, Distribution, Medical and 4 Forward Support Companies
 - Brigade Troops Battalion
 - Signal Company
 - Military Intelligence Company; UAV Platoon
 - Military Police Platoon
 - Engineer Company
- Draws 390-400 Up-armored HMMWVs (UAHs)



Bottomline: IBCT can put approximately 800 Infantryman on the ground, which makes them ideally suited for operations in complex terrain such as urban areas. As many as 535 (requested number) HMMWVs provides the IBCT enhanced mobility. The BCTs protection is enhanced by its ability to provide full sensory capability as it moves.



04 March 2007

Sunni Support Zone

Threat Conditions:

- Accelerants from Taji-Tarmiya, Sa'ab al Bour impacting OTF progress
- Sunni Support Zone Operational Conditions:**
- 2/1 CD interdicts the accelerants of sectarian violence in Taji/Tarmiya
- 2/9 OPCON to BOC on 01 Mar 07

Anbar

Threat Conditions:

- Tipping point not yet reached Sunni AIF still stronger than ISF/SAA
- Anbar Operational Conditions:**
- 21 MEU remains in AO Denver until 30 Mar
- 1/3 ID has conducted RIPTOA with 1/1 AD in Ramadi on 19 Jan 07
- II MEF, 2d RCT and 6th RCT have completed RIPTOA with I MEF

Baghdad

Threat Conditions:

- Sectarian violence leveling off due to ISF/CF opns
- Baghdad Operational Conditions:**
- 2/82 ABN has begun CCR operations in Adamiyah
- Kadamiyah and Rashid (East) are in a control phase and JSSs are established and operational
- Karadh and New Baghdad remain in control phase
- BOC-AT is initial operationing capable as of 5 Feb 07

Balad/Baqubah

Threat Conditions:

- Accelerants from Baghdad escalating sectarian violence
- Baqubah/Balad Operational Conditions:**
- 3/1 CD ICW 5 IA conducts operations to neutralize Sunni and Shia extremists that conduct EJKs, IED and IDF attacks
- 3/1 CD ICW 5 IA conducts operations to interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence

Diyala

Threat Conditions:

- Accelerants from Baghdad escalating sectarian violence
- Diyala Operational Conditions:**
- 3/1 CD is assisting BiTT at the POE of Muthariyah IOT reduce illegal cross border activity and stem the flow of

1.4b

Southern Belt

Threat Conditions:

- Accelerants from the 'fiyahs' and Salman Pak impacting OTF progress
- Southern Belts Operational Conditions:**
- 4/6 IA is OPCON to BOC on 1 Mar
- 4/25 and 2/10 conduct operations to interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence and neutralize VBIED network
- 4/6 IA continues COIN operations in Latifiyah with 4/25 ABN and 2/10 MTN

Task: Interdict the accelerants of

sectarian violence in the southern belts

Purpose: To allow CF/ISF to secure the population of Baghdad

SHIA SUPPORT ZONE



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFH//MR~~

Confirmation

Decision Points 9a

(3/3 ID)



Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505

Decision: Request BCT #18 be brought forward from Kuwait and employed in Baghdad

Desired Effects:

- 1B: Populace in Urban Centers Secure
3C: Perpetrators of sectarian violence neutralized
3B: Insurgency lacks the ability to conduct effective ops
4A: IED Network Neutralized

SIR

1. What is the state of the AQL threat in Al Anbar Province?
2. What is the current level of sectarian violence in Baghdad/Baqubah?
3. Are the accelerants of sectarian violence (EJK, VBIEDs) present in Baghdad/Baqubah?
4. What is the status of militias in Baghdad?
5. Are EFPs effective against Coalition and/or Iraqi Security Forces?
6. What is the current status of the nine administrative districts of Baghdad?
7. How effective are AQL insurgents in Baghdad Security Belts?
8. What is the current level of violence in Sadr City?

FFIR

1. Do we have enough forces to secure the Baghdad berm/barrier?
2. Do we have enough forces to interdict/neutralize T&FFs along the TRV and ERV?
3. Do we have enough forces to Clear, Control, and Retain Baghdad's nine administrative districts?
4. Do we have enough forces to disrupt the flow of VBIED's and EFPs into Baghdad?
5. Do we have enough forces to secure the Southern LOCs?
6. Do we have enough forces to secure the Baghdad Security Belt?

18

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
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HBCT Capability

What special capabilities does this unit bring to the fight?

- 3800 soldiers
- Core capabilities
 - 2 Combined Arms Battalions=8 Combined Arms Companies
 - 1 Armored Reconnaissance Squadron=3 Recon Troops
 - 1 Fires Battalion=2 Firing Batteries; 3 JTACs; Target Acquisition Platoon
 - Brigade Troops Battalion
 - Signal Company
 - Military Intelligence Company; TUAV Platoon
 - Military Police Platoon
 - Support Battalion=Maintenance, Distribution, Medical and 4 Forward Support Companies
- Draws 390-400 UAHs; Draws Legacy APS-5



Bottomline: The HBCT, although more difficult to sustain, provides protection to the force in heavily defended insurgent strongholds and high rate of survivability against IED threats. Although not ideally suited for urban terrain, the HBCT has proven capabilities of its thermal sights and precision medium direct fires systems in support of it's Infantry. Armor combined with HMMWV mobility provides

3-3 BCT

31D HQ Deploys

16 Jan - 10 Feb		10 - 17 Feb		26 Feb - 2 Mar		4 Mar - 5 Apr		15-30 Mar		31 Mar-14 Apr		19
NTC Rotation		Load & Rail to Benning		Rail Activity & Staging		Sail Time (East Coast)		FAST SEALIFT CONOPS		STRAT AIR CONOPS		
		Regen/Refit		Vessel Load		RDL-P		15 MAR		28 MAR		

31 May 2007

Sunni Support Zone

Threat Conditions:

- Accelerants from Taji-Tammiya, Sa'ab al Bour impacting OTF progress
 - Increased AQI/AIF presence
- Sunni Support Operational Conditions:
- Salah ad Din PIC Apr 07

Anbar

Threat Conditions:

- Sunni AIF losing ground to ISF/SAA
- Anbar Operational Conditions:
- 2 Marine Rifle Battalions are initial operational capable in Anbar Province 10 Mar 07
- 3 Embedded PRTs established NLT 31 March
- MEU has departed the ITO

Baghdad

Threat Conditions:

- Sectarian violence levels off due to ISF/CF opns Baghdad Operational Conditions:
- 2/82 ABN and 4/1 ID committed to Baghdad
- 6th and 9th IA operationally OPCON to BOC 1 Mar 07
- Rashid (West) and Rusafa are in Clear phase
- Rashid (East), Adamiyah and Karakh are in Control phase
- Kadamiyah, Karadah and New Baghdad are in the Retain phase
- 6 Embedded PRTs established NLT 31 March 07
- 3ID HQs IOC in East Baghdad

Balad/Baqubah

Threat Conditions:

- Accelerants from Baghdad and Anbar escalating sectarian violence
- Baqubah/Balad Operational Conditions:
- No Change

Diyala

Threat Conditions:

- Accelerants from Baghdad and Anbar escalating sectarian violence
- Diyala Operational Conditions:
- *Diyala templated to go PIC Apr 07*
 - 3/1 CD operating in Combined Operating Area
 - 5IA OPCON to IGFC 01 Apr 07
 - 3/1 CD is assisting BiTT at the POE of Muthariyah
 - IOT reduce illegal cross border activity and stem the

1.4b

Southern Belt

Threat Conditions:

- Accelerants from Salman Pak / Yusufiyah impacting OTF progress
 - Increased AQI/AIF presence
- Southern Belts Operational Conditions:
- 4/25 and 2/10 conduct operations ICW 4/6 IA to interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence and neutralize VBIED network
 - 4/25 and 2/10 operate in COAs

SHIA SUPPORT ZONE



~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFH//MR~~

Confirmation

Decision Points 9b

(4/2 SBCT)



Declassified by: MG Michael X. Garrett,
USCENTCOM Chief of Staff
Declassified on: 201505

Decision: Request BCT #19 be brought forward from Kuwait and employed in Baghdad

Desired Effects:

- 1B: Populace in Urban Centers Secure
- 3C: Perpetrators of sectarian violence neutralized
- 3B: Insurgency lacks the ability to conduct effective ops
- 4A: IED Network Neutralized

SIR

1. What is the current state of the AQL threat in Al Anbar?
2. What is the current level of sectarian violence in the 9+1 key cities?
3. Are the accelerants of sectarian violence (EJK, VBIEDs) present in Baghdad/Baqubah?
4. What is the status of militias in Baghdad/Baqubah?
5. Are EFPs effective against Coalition and/or Iraqi Security Forces?
6. What is the current status of the nine administrative districts of Baghdad?
7. How effective are AQL insurgents in the Baghdad Security Belt?
8. What is the level of violence in Tharwa?

FFIR

1. Do the Iraqi Security Forces have enough combat power to continue Clear/ Control/ Retain operations in Baghdad?
2. Do we have enough forces to prevent the spread of sectarian violence in the 9+1 key cities?
3. Do we have enough forces to disrupt the flow of illegal contraband across the border?
1.4b
4. Do we have enough forces to disrupt the flow of VBIED's and EFPs into Baghdad?
5. Do we have enough forces to secure the Southern LOCs?
6. Do we have enough forces to secure Al-Anbar?
7. Do we have enough forces to secure the Baghdad Belts?


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What special capabilities does this unit bring to the fight?

- 3900 soldiers
Core capabilities
- 3 Stryker Battalions=9 Stryker Companies; 9 MGS Platoons; 9 Mortar Sections, 3 Scout Platoons
 - 1 RSTA Squadron=3 Recon Troops; Mortar Platoon
 - 1 Fires Battalion=3 Firing Batteries; 5 JTACs; Target Acquisition Platoon
 - Anti-Tank Company
 - Engineer Company
 - Signal Company
 - Military Intelligence Company; Multi-sensor unit;
- TUAV Platoon
- Military Police C2 Cell
 - Support Battalion=Maintenance, Distribution, Medical Companies; 120 UAHs



Bottomline: The SBCT is a highly-mobile, survivable force that can be rapidly repositioned across the battlespace and operate in a non-contiguous environment due to its connectivity and reach back capability. The SBCT possesses a mobile SIGINT detection capability that makes it ideal for precision, intel-driven strike operations in urban or rural terrain. This is complimented by an attendant, robust assault capability that rapidly delivers Infantry squads and platoons to the objective.

4-2 SBCT

14 Feb - 4 Mar
Refit / Stryker Slat
Armor Retrofit

11 Mar – 15 Apr
Sail Time (West Coast)

RLO-E
4 MAR 1968

**Retrofit starts
on 16 Feb**

**4-8 Mar
Rail Activity
& Staging**

1 - 14 Feb
Homestation MRE
w/ JRTC Staff

RI D-2

9 Apr

15-30 Apr 1 May-15 May 22

~~SECRET//REF TO USA and MCF//MR~~

01 May 2007

Sunni Support Zone

Northern Belts Operational Conditions:

- 2/1 CD ICW 2/9 IA conducts combined operations to interdict the accelerants of sectarian violence in Taji/Tarmiyah

Anbar

Anbar Operational Conditions:

- 2 Marine Rifle Battalions operating in Fallujah and Haditha Triad

Baghdad

Baghdad Operational Conditions:

- 6 of the 9 districts in Transition Phase
- Tharwa remains isolated

Balad/Baqubah

Baqubah/Balad Operational Conditions:

- 3/1 CD ICW 5 IA conducts operations to neutralize Sunni and Shia extremists that conduct EJKs, IED and IDF attacks
- Conducts operations to interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence

Diyala

Diyala Operational Conditions:

- 5 IA is OPCON to IGFC
 - 3/1 CD is operating in COAs
 - 3/1 CD is assisting BiTT at the POE of Muthariyah IOT reduce illegal cross border activity and stem the
- 1.4b
- Diyala at PIC

Southern Belt

Southern Belts Operational Conditions:

- 4/6 IA is OPCON to BOC on 1 Mar
- 4/25 and 2/10 conduct operations ICW 4/6 IA to interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence and neutralize VBIED network
- 4/25 and 2/10 operate in COAs south of Baghdad
- Babil and Wasit PIC May 07

Task: CCR selected admin district(s)

Task: Interdict the accelerants of sectarian violence in the southern belts

Purpose: To allow CF/ISF to secure the population of Baghdad

Task: Interdict the accelerants of sectarian violence in the northern belts

Purpose: To allow CF/ISF to secure the population of Baghdad

Task: Interdict the accelerants of sectarian violence in Diyala

Purpose: To allow CF/ISF to secure the population of Baghdad

Task: Defeat AQI & Sunni extremists

Purpose: To fully exploit success in Anbar

SHIA SUPPORT ZONE



Confirmation

Decision Points 9c

(2/3 ID)

Decision: Request BCT #20 be brought forward from Kuwait and employed in Baghdad

Desired Effects:

1B: Populace in Urban Centers Secure
3C: Perpetrators of sectarian violence neutralized

3B: Insurgency lacks the ability to conduct effective ops
4A: IED Network Neutralized

SIR

1. What is the current level of sectarian violence in Baghdad?
2. Are the accelerants of sectarian violence (EJK, VBIEDs) present in Baghdad?
3. What is the status of militias in Baghdad?
4. Are EFPs effective against Coalition and/or Iraqi Security Forces?
5. What is the current status of the nine administrative districts of Baghdad?

FFIR

1. Do we have enough forces to secure the Baghdad berm/barrier?
2. Do we have enough forces to enhance MITTs and dedicated TST forces?
3. Does MNC-I possess the ability to Clear, Control, Retain Thwara?
4. Do we have enough forces to secure Al-Anbar?
5. Do we have enough forces to secure Iraq's borders?


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HBCT Capability

What special capabilities does this unit bring to the fight?

- 3800 soldiers
- Core capabilities
 - 2 Combined Arms Battalions=8 Combined Arms Companies
 - 1 Armored Reconnaissance Squadron=3 Recon Troops
 - 1 Fires Battalion=2 Firing Batteries; 3 JTACs; Target Acquisition Platoon
 - Brigade Troops Battalion
 - UAV Platoon
 - Signal Company
 - Military Intelligence Company
 - Military Police Platoon
 - Support Battalion=Maintenance, Distribution, Medical and 4 Forward Support Companies
- 535 Up-armored HMMWVs; Brings home-station equipment set



Bottomline:

The HBCT, although more difficult to sustain, provides protection to the force in heavily defended insurgent strongholds and along high IED threat routes. Although not ideally suited for urban terrain, the HBCT has proven capabilities of its thermal sights and precision medium direct fires systems in support of it's Infantry. Armor combined with HMMWV mobility provides

2-3 BCT

14 Mar – 5 Apr Regen/Refit
10 – 13 Apr Vessel Load
13 Apr – 15 May Sail Time (East Coast)
15 May LAD-P

RLD-E
5 APR

28 Feb – 14 Mar
Homestation MRE
w/ NTC Staff

5 – 9 Apr
Rail Activity
& Staging

RLD-P
9 May

15-30 May 31 May-14 June

25

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCFI//MR~~

31 May 2007

Sunni Support Zone

Northern Belts Operational Conditions:

- 2/1 CD ICW 2/9 IA conducts combined operations to interdict the accelerants of sectarian violence in Taji/Tarmiyah

Anbar

Anbar Operational Conditions:

- 2 Marine Rifle Battalions are initial operational capable in Anbar Province 10 Mar 07

Baghdad

Baghdad Operational Conditions:

- 7 of 9 districts in Transition Phase
- Tharwa remains isolated

Balad/Baqubah

Baqubah/Balad Operational Conditions:

- 3/1 CD ICW 5 IA conducts operations to neutralize Sunni and Shia extremists that conduct EJKs, IED and IDF attacks
- Conducts combined operations to interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence

Diyala

Diyala Operational Conditions:

- 5 IA is OPCON to IGFC
- 3/1 CD is operating in COAs

Southern Belt

Southern Belts Operational Conditions:

- 4/6 IA is OPCON to BOC on 1 Mar
- 4/25 and 2/10 conduct combined operations ICW 4/6 IA to interdict accelerants of Baghdad sectarian violence and neutralize VBIED network
- 4/25 and 2/10 operate in COAs south of Baghdad

Task: Interdict the accelerants of sectarian violence in the northern belts
Purpose: To allow CF/ISF to secure the population of Baghdad

Task: Interdict the accelerants of sectarian violence in Diyala
Purpose: To allow CF/ISF to secure the population of Baghdad

Task: Defeat AQI & Sunni extremists
Purpose: To fully exploit success in Anbar

Task: CCR selected admin district(s)

Task: Interdict the accelerants of sectarian violence in the southern belts
Purpose: To allow CF/ISF to secure the population of Baghdad

SHIA SUPPORT ZONE



Timeline

JAN FEB MAR APR MAY JUN

4-1 ID

Flight Window
15-30 Feb 31 Feb-14 Mar

Personnel Flow
25 Jan - 15 Feb

3-3 ID

16 Jan - 10 Feb
NTC Rotation

10 - 17 Feb
Load & Rail
to Benning

26 Feb - 2 Mar
Rail Activity
& Staging

17 - 26 Feb
Regen/Refit

2 - 4 Mar
Vessel Load

14 Feb - 4 Mar
Refit / Stryker Slat
Armor Retrofit

8 - 11 Mar
Vessel Load

11 Mar - 15 Apr
Sail Time (West Coast)

15-30 Mar 31 Mar-14 Apr

FAST
SEAL
FT
CONO
PS-28
MAR

STRAT
AIR
CONO
PS-15
MAR

RLD
-P
12
Mar

RLD-E

4-2 SBCT

1-14 Feb
Homestation MRE
w/ JRTC Staff

4-8 Mar
Rail Activity
& Staging

14 Mar - 5 Apr
Regen/Refit

10 - 13 Apr
Vessel Load

13 Apr - 15 May
Sail Time (East Coast)

15-30 Apr 1 May-15 May

RLD-P
9 Apr

RLD-E

2-3 ID

28 Feb - 14 Mar
Homestation MRE
w/ NTC Staff

5 - 9 Apr
Rail Activity
& Staging

15-30 May 31 May-14 June

RLD-P
9 May

RLD-E

LAD-P
15 May

27

~~SECRET//REL to USA and MCF//MR~~

Transportation timeline derived from FORSCOM brief

4-2 SBCT

1 - 14 Feb
Homestation MRE
w/ JRTC Staff

4 - 8 Mar
Rail Activity
& Staging

14 Mar - 5 Apr
Regen/Refit

10 - 13 Apr
Vessel Load

13 Apr - 15 May
Sail Time (East Coast)

15-30 Apr 1 May-15 May

RLD-P
9 Apr

RLD-E

2-3 ID

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Prime Minister's Directive

- All Iraq's international borders will be closed DTG TBD
- Appointment of the Baghdad Operational Commander—all MoD and Mol forces assigned report to the BOC
- BOC defined as 9 admin districts and the battlespace controlled by the 6th (Yusafiyah, Latifiyah and Mamudiyah) and 9th IA (south and west of Taji)
- SoE measures include:
 - Curfew in the BOC 8 PM to 6 AM except competent authorities and humanitarian emergencies
 - No weapons carried in public and weapons, ammunition and dangerous materials permits suspended. PSDs can only carry weapons when they are with their principal
 - With the assistance of MNF-I forces the BOC are authorized to question, search and detain, any person necessary IAW Iraqi law
 - Cordon, enter and search private and public property
 - Seize contraband
 - Control movement of persons and vehicles to include Mol and MoD convoys
 - Conduct route security clearance operations
 - Apply preventative measures to all mail and wireless communications means and equipment
 - Impose restrictions on public places as necessary for safety and good order
- Persons who violate these measures or instigates, provides support or encourages such acts will be subject to serious penalty IAW Anti-Terrorism Law
- All offenders will be dealt with before the Grand Crimes Chamber of the Central Criminal Court of Iraq
- MoD and Mol forces authorized to enforce Anti-Terrorism Law against illegal armed groups, terrorists gangs, or any person who practices criminal and terrorists acts
- Houses of worship will be respected. Houses of worship used by terrorists forfeit its protected status
- No citizen is to be displaced from his home. Illegal occupiers of IDPs house will be subject to legal proceedings, liable for damages, vacate the house and return contents to the owner
- Drivers and passengers must display valid license and vehicle registration—vehicles with tinted windows will be subject to legal proceedings under the Anti-Terrorism Law
- Legal action will be taken against anyone who keeps a government vehicle at his house without official approval
- MoD and Mol forces shall respect human rights when conducting security measures listed the PM Directive
- The BOC is to provide weekly briefings on operations to the PM Crisis Cell

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Operation Together Forward

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CONOPS: Interdict MSR Mobile, for the surge period continue Exploitation of the CERV, and interdict Ramadi-Fallujah Corridor

- From 10-20 Feb 07, TF 1.4a RIPS with a Bn TF built around 3rd ReconBn. Upon RIP complete, ReconBn TF (MSC for MNF-W) interdicts MSR Mobile, disrupts at POEs Waleed and Trebil, and isolates Rutbah.
- Upon arrival, 1st Bn 2d Mar (-) reinforces RCT 2 in the CERV. RCT 2 continues to exploit success in the Haditha Triad and interdicts along MSR Bronze and Phoenix GLOCs. 1/2 detaches 1 x company to MNF-W Reserve.
- 1/1 AD continues to clear / retain Ramadi. Attach 1 x company from 2/5.
- Upon arrival, 2d Bn 5th Mar (-) reinforces RCT 6 in the Fallujah-Ramadi Corridor. RCT 6 interdicts along MSRs Michigan, Mobile, Lincoln, and Chicago. 2/5 detaches 1 x company to 1/1 AD

